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Abstract
Quantum mechanics provides means of generating genuine randomness that is impossible with
deterministic classical processes. Remarkably, the unpredictability of randomness can be certi-
fied in a self-testing manner that is independent of implementation devices. Here, we present
an experimental demonstration of self-testing quantum random number generation based on an
detection-loophole free Bell test with entangled photons. In the randomness analysis, without
the assumption of independent identical distribution, we consider the worst case scenario that
the adversary launches the most powerful attacks against quantum adversary. After considering
statistical fluctuations and applying an 80 Gb × 45.6 Mb Toeplitz matrix hashing, we achieve a
final random bit rate of 114 bits/s, with a failure probability less than 10−5. Such self-testing
random number generators mark a critical step towards realistic applications in cryptography and
fundamental physics tests.
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Introduction.— Random numbers are widely used in applications ranging from numerical
simulation and cryptography to lottery. While the foremost property of random number
generators (RNGs) in many applications is distribution uniformity of its outputs, secure
information processing applications such as cryptography demand additionally that the de-
vices to produce randomness must be secure against any adversaries, regardless of classical
or quantum mechanics. Classical RNGs have a deterministic nature and hence are not ran-
dom. Quantum random number generators (QRNGs) rely on the unpredictability in break-
ing quantum coherence and are theoretically unpredictable. However, the unpredictability
may be jeopardized in practice because the adversary may gain information about the de-
vices and even maliciously manipulate the devices of QRNGs, which is often undetected by
a finite set of statistical tests. Self-testing QRNGs certify the randomness unconditionally
based on the loophole free violation of Bell’s inequality, offering a reliable way of generating
genuine randomness in a device-independent manner and therefore holding great promise
for future applications. (See Ref. [1, 2] for a review of QRNGs.)
Considering a loophole free Bell test experiment. Alice and Bob are honest parties at
two remote sites, each receives one of a pair of entangled photons and measures its quan-
tum state with a randomly selected measurement setting. Alice and Bob may not trust
the devices because the devices may be prepared by the adversary. The experiment ob-
serves no-signaling theorem, i.e., even at the speed of light, no information of measurement
setting is conveyed to the source prior to the emission of entangled photon pairs (to close
randomness loophole) and no information about Alice’s (Bob’s) measurement setting and
measurement outcomes are conveyed to Bob (Alice) prior to his (her) state measurement
(to close locality loophole). The photon-detection efficiency is sufficiently high for the ex-
periment to be free from the detection loophole. Local hidden variable theories (based on
classical determinism) set a bound to the correlation measurement between Alice and Bob.
Breaking the bound exhibits quantum correlation, which cannot be explained by classical
deterministic mechanisms. This nonlocal quantum correlation certifies that Alice and Bob’s
measurement outcomes possess genuine quantum randomness which is unaccessible to the
adversary, irrelevant to the implementation devices [3, 4].
As we deepen the understanding of self-testing QRNG [5–13], the security analysis be-
comes more efficient in producing randomness and more robust to noise. In particular,
the entropy accumulation theorem formulated by Dupuis, Fawzi, and Renner [12] converts
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a single-short result to the multiple-shot case. Exploiting the entropy accumulation theo-
rem, Arnon-Friedman, Renner and Vidick proposed a self-testing QRNG analysis method
without the assumption of independent identical distribution (i.i.d.), which nevertheless pro-
duces randomness with yield approaching the value for the i.i.d. case [13]. The analysis is
also against quantum adversary. So far there were two reported experimental studies on
self-testing QRNG. One was based on a detection loophole free Bell test experiment with
entangled ions [14], which produced random bits at a rate of 1.5× 10−5 bit s−1 without the
assumption of i.i.d. The analysis is against classical adversary. The other one was based on
a detection loophole free Bell test experiment with entangled photons [15], which produced
random bits at a rate of 0.4 bit s−1, albeit with the assumption of i.i.d.
Very recently, several experiments demonstrated the violation of Bell’s inequality with
both locality and detection loopholes closed simultaneously [16–19]. It was also shown that
the randomness loophole can be progressively addressed with cosmic RNGs [20–22], which
take advantage of randomness at the remote celestial object to set the time constraint of
local hidden variable mechanisms deep into the cosmic history. These works pave the way
to construct a practical self-testing QRNG. Here we report an experimental realization of
a self-testing QRNG based on a detection loophole free Bell test with entangled photon
pairs, with randomness extraction of 114 bits s−1 and uniformity within 10−5, which is
a significant improvement over the previous experiment [14]. The randomness generation
analysis is against the most powerful quantum adversary attacks and does not rely on the
independent identical distribution assumption. Our experiment marks a critical step for
generating self-testing QRNGs for practical applications.
Proposal.— The self-testing QRNG protocol is based on the Bell test experiment, namely
a Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt game [23]. In each experimental trial, Alice and Bob per-
form state measurements upon receiving random inputs x and y and produce outputs a
and b, respectively. According to local hidden variable models, the correlations described
by probability distributions p(ab|xy) in the i.i.d. scenario are factorable with p(ab|xy) =∑
λ p(λ)p(a|x, λ)p(b|y, λ). The J-value of the CHSH game satisfies an inequality,
J =
1
4
∑
abxy
βabxyp(ab|xy)− 3/4 ≤ 0, (1)
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where the pay-off coefficient is given by
βabxy =
1, if a⊕ b = x · y0 if a⊕ b 6= x · y , (2)
with ⊕ standing for plus modulo 2. Quantum theory allows J > 0 as opposed to local
hidden variable models.
In practice, all Bell test experiments have finite statistics. Instead of approximating
probability distributions based on the i.i.d. assumption, we introduce the Bell value Ji in
experimental trial i,
Ji =
1, if ai ⊕ bi = xi · yi0, otherwise . (3)
The CHSH game value is an average of Ji for all n experimental trials,
J¯ =
1
n
n∑
j=1
Ji − 3/4. (4)
Here, we consider the case that the average probability of measurement setting choice is
unbiased, p(xy) = 1/4. Violating the inequality in Eq. (1), J¯ > 0, indicates the presence
of genuine quantum randomness in the measurement outcomes. The randomness can be
quantified by the smooth min-entropy Hεsmin(AB|XYE) based on the CHSH game value J¯
and the number of experiment trials [13], which is bounded by,
Hεsmin(AB|XYE) ≥ n ·Ropt(εs, εEA, ωexp). (5)
Here A (B) and X (Y) denote the input and output sequences of Alice (Bob), respectively;
E denotes side information of a general quantum adversary; εs is the smoothing parameter;
ωexp is the expected CHSH game value. εEA is the probability of aborting the protocol;
Hεsmin(AB|XYE) describes the amount of unpredictable randomness that can be extracted
from the outputs AB against the inputs XY and any adversary E; as a conservative estima-
tion, we take the lower bound Ropt(εs, εEA, ωexp) as the theoretical amount of randomness on
average for each trial. εcQRNG is the completeness error, i.e., the probability for a protocol to
abort for an honest implementation is at most εcQRNG. The lower bound for the smooth min-
entropy Hεsmin(AB|XYE) is smaller when the average probability of measurement setting
choice is biased (See Supplemental Materials).
We experimentally implement the self-testing QRNG with the following procedure,
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1. Bell test:
(a) In experimental trial i, Alice and Bob receive random inputs Xi and Yi and
produce outputs Ai and Bi, respectively.
(b) We assign a CHSH game value Ji according to the pay-off in Eq. (3) and calculate
the average pay-off according to Eq. (4).
(c) We abort the protocol if J¯ < ωexp − δest. Here the completeness error is up-
per bounded by εcQRNG ≤ exp (−2nδ2est), where δest ∈ (0, 1) is the width of the
statistical confidence interval for the Bell violation estimation test.
2. Randomness estimation: conditioned on the violation of Bell’s inequality in the ex-
periment, either the protocol aborts with probability greater than 1 − εEA or the
experiment produces randomness given by Eq. (5).
3. Randomness extraction: for a given failure probability of less than 2−te , we apply the
Toeplitz-matrix hashing extractor with a matrix of size n ×Hεsmin(AB|XYE) − te to
extract Hεsmin(AB|XYE)− te random bits that is εs close to the uniform distribution.
Here, we set te = 100.
Experiment.— The experimental layout is shown in Fig. 1. We enclose a periodically
poled potassium titanyl phosphate (PPKTP) crystal in a Sagnac loop. With the injection
of pump pulses at wavelength of 780 nm and pulse width of 10 ns at a repetition rate of
100 kHz, the loop emits polarization-entangled photon pairs at the degenerate wavelength of
1560 nm via spontaneous parametric downconverison process. The two photons of the pair
travel in opposite directions. They are subject to polarization state measurements by Alice
and Bob and are detected by superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPD).
In each experimental trial, the dichotomic photon-detection results of SNSPDs, 1 for ”click”
and 0 for ”no click”, are time-tagged for correlation analysis.
In our experiment, the overall single photon detection efficiency is determined to be
78.6% ± 1.5% for Alice and 80.2% ± 1.5% for Bob [24]. The two-photon interference visi-
bility is measured to be 99.5%± 2% (97.8%± 1.5%) in the horizontal (diagonal) basis. Us-
ing Eberhard’s method [25], we generate nonmaximally entangled state, cos(20.5◦) |HV 〉 +
sin(20.5◦) |V H〉 and set angles of half-wave plates in polarization state measurements to be
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FIG. 1. Schematics for self-testing QRNG. Light pulses of 10 ns, 100 kHz from a 1560 nm seed
laser (LD) are amplified by an erbium-doped fiber amplifier (EDFA), and up-converted to pulses
at 780 nm via second-harmonic generation (SHG) in an in-line periodically poled lithium niobate
(PPLN) waveguide. The residual 1560 nm light is removed by a wavelength-division multiplexer
(WDM) and spectral filters. A half-wave plate (HWP) and a liquid crystal (LC) is used to adjust
the pump polarization. The 780 nm light pulses are focused into a periodically poled potassium
titanyl phosphate (PPKTP) crystal in a Sagnac loop to generate polarization entangled photon
pairs. After removing the 780 nm pump pulses by dichroic mirrors (DMs) and a 1 mm thick silicon
plate, the entangled photons at 1560 nm are subject to polarization state measurements and then
sent to superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPD) via 130 m optical fiber.
A1 = −84.0◦ or A2 = −118.7◦ for Alice, B1 = 6◦ or B2 = −28.7◦ for Bob, respectively, to
have an optimum violation of Bell’s inequality (see Supplemental Materials).
Previous Bell test experiments assigned measurement settings (xy) randomly with inputs
from locally generated QRNGs [16–19]. RNGs including cosmic RNGs will be exploited to
address the no-signaling issue in the input randomness [20–22]. For the current experiment,
the settings are preset manually with parameters given by the Eberhard’s optimization
procedure as described above. The total photon detection efficiencies are high to close the
detection loophole. We repeat the experiment by equal number of trials (N = 1 × 1010)
per measurement setting choice xy and record the number of correlated events Nab|xy (see
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Tab. I). According to Eq. (4-6), the J-value of the CHSH game is given by
JN = JA1B1 + JA1B2 + JA2B1 + JA2B2 − 3/4, (6)
with the Bell value J for settings x = Ai, y = Bj, and outputs ab given by
JA1B1 = (Nab=00|A1B1 +Nab=11|A1B1)/N,
JA1B2 = (Nab=00|A1B2 +Nab=11|A1B2)/N,
JA2B1 = (Nab=00|A2B1 +Nab=11|A2B1)/N,
JA2B2 = (Nab=01|A2B2 +Nab=10|A2B2)/N.
(7)
For a total number of experimental trials n = 4N = 4×1010, the obtained J-value is 3.52×
10−4, indicating that our CHSH game rejects local hidden variable models. In our analysis,
we set the expected CHSH game value to the one measured in the experiment, ωexp =
3.52×10−4, εs = εEA = 1/
√
n = 5×10−6 and δest =
√
10/n = 1.58×10−5. Correspondingly,
after applying an 80 Gb × 45.6 Mb Toeplitz matrix hashing, the experiment produces
4.56 × 107 genuine random bits in total with uniformity within εs + εEA = 10−5. The
randomness generation speed is 0.00114 bits per trial or 114 bits/s, which is an improvement
of ×107 over the previous experiment [14]. With such a high yield, the stream of random bits
pass the NIST statistic test suite for the first time of its kind (see Supplemental Materials).
TABLE I. Number of correlated events for equal number of trials (1010) per measurement base
settings: A1B1, A1B2, A2B1 and A2B2. a = 0 or 1 indicates that Alice detects a photon or not,
the same b for Bob. Mean photon number µ = 0.15, violation Jn = 3.52× 10−4.
Basis settings ab = 00 ab = 10 ab = 01 ab = 11
A1B1 9780816728 49862593 57002217 112318462
A1B2 9574958251 41366122 263425568 120250059
A2B1 9577555854 253683380 46874032 121886734
A2B2 9255451323 361101111 365181363 18266203
With the same parameter setting, we plot the amount of randomness that can be produced
by our experiment as a function of the number of experimental trials, which asymptotically
approaches the optimal asymptotic value for i.i.d. as shown in Fig. 2. The amount of
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randomness obtained in the current experiment is about 60% of the optimal asymptotic
value.
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FIG. 2. Randomness generation versus number of experimental trials. We set the expected CHSH
game value to be ωexp = 3.52× 10−4, εs = εEA = 1/
√
n and δest =
√
10/n for finite data rate.
One may expect to extract more randomness, even by orders of magnitude, for larger
violations in the CHSH game with improved experimental parameters such as higher photon-
detection efficiency, higher two-photon interference visibility, and optimized mean photon
numbers (see Supplemental Materials), as shown in Fig. 4.
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FIG. 3. Randomness generation versus expected CHSH game value. We set εs = εEA = 1/
√
n and
δest =
√
10/n for finite data rate curves.
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Conclusion and outlook.— We implement a self-testing QRNG without the detection
loophole, which does not need the assumption of identical and independent distribution and
is against quantum adversary. We report randomness extraction at a rate of 114 bits/s with
uniformity within 10−5, marking a critical step in generating self-testing QRNG for secure
information processing applications and tests of fundamental physics. One of the prospective
works is to employ cosmic RNGs in a loophole free CHSH game such that the generated
random bits are genuinely quantum-certified. Also, one can further speedup the randomness
production by upgrading the utilized technology such as scaling up the operation repetition
rate. One may note that the analysis method in Ref. [13] is efficient in producing quantum-
certified randomness based on a CHSH game. However, it remains an open question what
is the actual maximum extractable randomness in a CHSH game, furthermore, what is the
maximum extractable randomness for a general nonlocal game.
Note added.— Recently, we become aware of a related work [26].
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Academy of Science, and the 1000 Youth Fellowship program in China.
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
I. THEORY OF SELF-TESTING QUANTUM RANDOM NUMBER GENERA-
TION
Here, we consider self-testing random number generation based on Bell test. Given a
randomness source R as input, we can expand the input randomness by exploiting the
protocol described below. At the end of the protocol, a classical string Z is returned.
Conditioned on the random source R and a potential adversary’s system E, the classical
string Z is close to uniform. Note that E may be initially correlated to the implementation
device. While running the protocol, the device is in the control of user and cannot signal
to Eve. Before introducing the protocol, we define the soundness εsQRNG and completeness
εcQRNG errors of a self-testing randomness generation protocol.
Definition 1. A randomness expansion protocol is (εcQRNG, ε
s
QRNG)-secure, if it satisfies:
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1. Soundness: For an untrusted device, it either aborts with probability less than Pabort
or returns a string Z satisfying
(1− Pabort)‖ρZRE − ρUm ⊗ ρUr ⊗ ρE‖ ≤ εsQRNG. (8)
Here, ρZRE denotes the state of the classical string Z, the input randomness source
R and the system of Eve E; ρUr denotes a string of uniform random bits. The above
inequality indicates that the output string is almost (εsQRNG) a uniform bit string and
it has no correlation with the input randomness and the adversary Eve.
2. Completeness: The honest device does not abort with probability greater than 1−εcQRNG.
A. Protocol description
The inputs for the Bell test experiment are required to be random, which consumes
random numbers. This inefficiency motivates the spot-checking protocol [11, 13, 27], where
Bell test is only run with probability q (usually small) and the input is fixed with probability
(1− q). A CHSH spot-checking protocol is shown as follows.
1. Bell test:
(a) The game involves two players, Alice and Bob. Each player inputs a bit and is
required to output a bit in each trial, for a total number of n trials. Denote their
input and output bits in trial i to be Xi and Yi and Ai and Bi, respectively.
(b) Choose a bit string t = (t1, · · · , tn), for any i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, ti ∈ {0, 1} according
to the distribution (1− q, q).
(c) If ti = 1, this trial is a test trial, which is used to test the existence of adversary.
Then Alice and Bob randomly input Xi = {0, 1}, Yi = {0, 1} and obtain Ai =
{0, 1}, Bi = {0, 1}. In each trial, a score is recorded according to a pay-off
function Ji(AiBiXiYi) ∈ {0, 1}, which is given as follows.
Ji(AiBiXiYi) =
1 Ai +Bi = Xi ∗ Yi0 Ai +Bi 6= Xi ∗ Yi (9)
(d) If ti = 0, this trial is a generation trial with fixed input string, Xi = 0 Yi = 0 and
Ji = 0.
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(e) (c)-(d) steps are repeated in n trials.
(f) If
∑
i Ji/n− 0.75 < ωexpq − δest, we abort the protocol. Otherwise, the protocol
can be used for quantum random number generation. And the completeness error
is upper bounded by εcQRNG ≤ exp (−2nδ2est).
2. Randomness estimation: conditioned on the Bell test is not aborted, either the protocol
aborts with probability less than εcQRNG or the amount of randomness is given by
Eq. (10).
3. Randomness extraction: with failure probability less than 2−te , we can extract n ·
Ropt(εs, εEA)− te random bits that is εsQRNG close to a uniform distribution by using
the Toeplitz-matrix hashing matrix.
B. Estimation of randomness production
In this work, we mainly focus on the security proof in Ref. [13] . The main tool of
the security proof is based on the entropy accumulation theorem (EAT) [12], which can
offer an avenue to reduce the complex multi-trial protocol to the i.i.d. case. After proving
that the device independent protocol satisfies the requirements of an EAT channel, the
entropy generated in the protocol can be analyzed based on the EAT theorem. Next, the
randomness production based on the violation of CHSH inequality [28] under the stronger
i.i.d. assumption can be connect to the non-i.i.d. case and gives a good lower bound for the
generated randomness.
According to Theorem 10 of [13], the optimal randomness yield is given by
Hεsmin(AB|XYE) ≥ n ·Ropt(εs, εEA). (10)
where the smoothed min-entropy Hεsmin(AB|XYE) evaluates the amount of extractable ran-
domness, εs is the smoothing parameter, εEA is the error probability of the entropy accu-
mulation protocol. Here, Ropt(εs, εEA) is defined as (given fixed q, n)
g(p) =

1− h
(
1
2
+ 1
2
√
16p
q
(p
q
− 1) + 3
)
p
q
∈ [0, 2+
√
2
4
]
1 p
q
∈ [2+
√
2
4
, 1]
(11)
12
fmin(p, pt) =
g(p) p ≤ ptd
dp
g(p)|pt · p+ (g(pt)− ddpg(p)|pt · pt) p > pt
(12)
R(p, pt, εs, εe) (13)
= fmin(p, pt)− 1√
n
2(log 13 +
d
dp
g(p)|pt)
√
1− 2 log(εs · εe). (14)
Ropt(εs, εe) = max
3
4
<
pt
q
< 2+
√
2
4
R(ωexp · q − δest, pt, εs, εe). (15)
where ωexp is the expected winning probability for an honest but noisy device, δest ∈ (0, 1)
is the width of the statistical confidence interval for the Bell violation estimation test. Thus
ωexp can be chosen according to the experimental winning scores
∑
i Ji and ωexp =
∑
i Ji/n−
0.75. A greater δest will lead to a higher randomness production. However, δest is bounded
by the number of trials N and another error εcQRNG, which represents the completeness error
of the entropy accumulation protocol,
εcQRNG ≤ exp(−2nδ2est) (16)
Considering the failure probability 2te in the randomness extraction process, the soundness
error for this protocol is
εsQRNG = εs + εEA + 2
te . (17)
C. Optimal parameter q
Define the net randomness output to be the difference between the output and input
randomness. In general, we can optimize the parameter q to find out the maximal net
randomness output per round,
Rnet = Ropt(εs, εEA)− h(q)− q (18)
For example consider δest = 10
−2, εs = 10−6, εEA = 10−6, wexp = 2+
√
2
4
− 0.75, the optimal q
which maximizes the Rnet can be found by numerical search for a given n. Here we give a
table for different n and the corresponding optimal q and Rnet.
In our experiment, we set q = 1. As we do not use randomness to choose the measurement
setting, the obtained randomness nRopt(εs, εEA) is the net randomness output.
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TABLE II. The relation between the net randomness rate, bias q, and number of experimental
trials n.
n q Rnet
107 - 0
108 0.0777 0.0256
109 0.0587 0.2175
1011 0.0486 0.3279
1014 0.0473 0.3417
D. Numerical result
As shown in Fig. 4, we consider the relation between the randomness output Ropt(εs, εEA)
and the expected CHSH value ωexp. Given the expected CHSH value ωexp, we also show in
Fig. 5 the minimal required number of trials to guarantee a nonzero randomness output.
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FIG. 4. Randomness generation with different expected violation. For the finite data rate curve,
we set εs = εEA = 1/
√
n and δest =
√
10/n for different number of experimental trials n.
Considering perfect state preparation and imperfect detection with efficiency η, the rela-
tion between the maximal expected CHSH value ωexp and the efficiency is shown in Fig. 6.
We also show the relation between the detection efficiency and the randomness output in
Fig. 7.
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FIG. 5. Minimal number of experimental trials n that has a nonzero randomness generation rate
for different expected violations. Here, we set εs = εEA = 1/
√
n and δest =
√
10/n for different
number of experimental trials n.
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FIG. 6. Maximal expected CHSH value ωexp with different detection efficiency, considering the
perfect state preparation and imperfect detection with efficiency η.
II. ENTANGLEMENT CHARACTERIZATION
To characterize the entangled photon pairs, we set the mean photon number to µ =
0.004 to decrease the multi-photon effect. We set the pump to be diagonal polarized |+〉,
to generate the maximum entangled state |Ψ+〉 = (|HV 〉 + |V H)/√2〉. The visibility is
measured under horizontal/vertical basis and diagonal/anti-diagonal basis, as 99.5 ± 2.0%
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and 97.8 ± 1.5%. We attribute the imperfection to multi-photon components, imperfect
optical elements, and imperfect spatial/spectral mode matching.
In testing the Bell inequality, we need to generate a non-maximally entangled state.
Considering the system heralding efficiency and the visibility, we optimize the state and
measurement basis based on 77% system efficiency, following Eberhard’s original article
[25]. The sub-optimal state is cos(20.5◦) |HV 〉+ sin(20.5◦) |V H〉 (with r = 0.37 for (|HV 〉+
r |V H〉)/√1 + r2). The measurement bases are a1 = −84.0◦, a2 = −118.7◦ for Alice, b1 = 6◦,
b2 = −28.7◦ for Bob.
We perform state tomography on the non-maximally entangled state cos(20.5◦) |HV 〉 +
sin(20.5◦) |V H〉. The result is shown in Fig. 8, the state fidelity is 99.3% compared to the
ideal state.
III. SYSTEM EFFICIENCY
The system efficiency is vital to close the detection loophole in Bell test. Normally, the
system efficiency includes the following parts: the entanglement source, the transmission
link, the detection. Here we consider each part individually.
The (system) heralding efficiency is defined as ηs = C/Ni and ηi = C/Ns, where the
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(a)
(b)
FIG. 8. (color online) Tomography of the produced state. The real and imaginary part are shown
in (a) and (b), respectively.
coincidence events (C) and the signal (idler) events Ns(Ni) can be measured during the
experiment. If considering the optical efficiency ηopt and the detector efficiency η
det
s (η
det
i ),
the entangled pair collection efficiency is ηopts = C/(Ni ·ηdets ·ηopt) and ηopti = C/(Ns ·ηdeti ·ηopt).
In a Sagnac based entanglement generation as we used in the experiment, a periodically
poled potassium titanyl phosphate (PPKTP) crystal is used as the nonlinear material to
generate photon pairs. The generated photon pairs will be collected into single mode fibers
for further modulation and detection. Theory predictions [29] and experimental tests [24, 30]
show it is possible to achieve a near unity heralding efficiency by selecting appropriate focal
parameters. For our source, we adjust the pump light beam waist to be around 180 µm,
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and the collection beam waist to be around 85 µm (see the setup section for detail). Theory
predicts the collection efficiency for the photons is 98% if the PPKTP is 0.9 cm thick.
In detection, We uses high efficiency superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors
(SNSPD) [31] to detect the received photons. The SNSPD is made of polycrystalline NbN,
and can achieve its best performance (saturate) at around 1.8 K temperature. In our exper-
iment, we cool the detector chips to less than 1K. In our test, the detectors are biased 0.2
µA below their critical current for stable operation. The single photon detection efficiencies
are 90.2% for Alice and 92.2% for Bob, with dark counts less than 100 s−1.
We measure the (system) heralding efficiency to be ηs = 78.6% ± 1.5% for Alice and
ηi = 80.2%±1.5% for Bob. The optical efficiency in the entanglement preparation is around
95.5%, the efficiency of the 130 meter fiber between the source and the detection is around
99%. We then estimate the entangled pair collection efficiency as ηopts = 92.1% for Alice and
ηopti = 92.0% for Bob.
IV. DETAILED EXPERIMENTAL PARAMETERS
We focus the pump and collection mode to the center of the PPKTP crystal. In exper-
iment, the pump light is spatial filtered by a 780HP single mode fiber. The light is the
focused using a aspherical lens with f=8 mm to the PPKTP that is around 70 cm away.
The pump waist is estimated to be 180 µm, and the beam quality M2 is around 1.05.
For collection, we used SMF28e single mode fiber. An Aspherical lens with f=11 mm
and a spherical lens with f=175 mm focus the beam to 85 µm at the center of PPKTP. The
spherical lens is placed in the middle, about 19 cm from the aspherical, and about 45 cm
from the PPKTP.
We measure the efficiencies of the optical elements individually, as shown in Tab. III.
The dimension of PPKTP we used is 1 mm×2 mm×10 mm, with a poling period of 46.5
µm. In our experiment, the pump power is about 3.5 mw, to create 15000 pairs entangled
photons per second.
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TABLE III. The efficiencies of optical elements
Optical element Efficiency
Asypherical lens 99.27%± 0.03%
Spherical lens 99.6%± 1.0%
Half wave plate (780nm/1560nm) 99.93%± 0.02%
Half wave plate (1560nm) 99.92%± 0.04%
Quater wave plate (1560nm) 99.99%± 0.08%
Polarization beam splitter (780nm/1560nm) 99.6%± 0.1%
Polarization beam splitter (1560nm) 99.6%± 0.2%
Silicon plate 99.7%± 0.2%
Dichromatic mirror 99.46%± 0.03%
PPKTP 99.6%± 0.2%
V. THE BELL INEQUALITY VIOLATIONWITH DIFFERENTMEAN PHOTON
NUMBER
In the experiment, we set the mean photon number to be around 0.15 per pulse. As
shown in Tab. V, the violation is Jn = 3.52 × 10−4 for 4 × 1010 trials. While previous
experiments used small mean photon number to reduce the multi-photon effect, we find an
optimized mean photon number by modeling the Bell test with multi-photons. When the
mean photon number is small, the quantum states in most of the experimental trials are
vacuum. Increasing mean photon number will increase the proportion of non vacuum states
and increase the Bell violation. The violation will decrease when the multi-photon effect
becomes significant. We find the optimal violation by numerical simulation, the results are
given in Tab. III-VIII.
VI. SIMULATION
In our simulation, we consider the i.i.d. case. We will only focus on the probability
distribution. Furthermore, we consider that the experiment observes the no-signaling the-
orem. In this case, we can equivalently consider the CH inequality. The CH inequality is
a bipartite Bell inequality with measurement settings x ∈ {0, 1} and y ∈ {0, 1}, and out-
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TABLE IV. The CHSH violation with different mean photon numbers.
Mean photon number CHSH violation
0.005 1.58× 10−5
0.01 6.29× 10−5
0.02 9.72× 10−5
0.05 1.99× 10−4
0.1 2.50× 10−4
0.15 3.52× 10−4
0.2 2.48× 10−4
TABLE V. Number of correlated events for equal number of trials (1010) per measurement base
settings: A1B1, A1B2, A2B1 and A2B2. a = 0 or 1 indicates that Alice detects a photon or not,
the same b for Bob. Mean photon number µ = 0.15, violation Jn = 3.52× 10−4.
Basis settings ab = 00 ab = 10 ab = 01 ab = 11
A1B1 9780816728 49862593 57002217 112318462
A1B2 9574958251 41366122 263425568 120250059
A2B1 9577555854 253683380 46874032 121886734
A2B2 9255451323 361101111 365181363 18266203
puts a, b ∈ {0, 1, u}, corresponding to 0, 1, and undetected events, respectively. The CH
TABLE VI. Number of correlated events for equal number of trials (5×107) per measurement base
settings. Mean photon number µ = 0.2, violation Jn = 2.48× 10−4.
Basis settings ab = 00 ab = 10 ab = 01 ab = 11
A1B1 48453853 355764 397898 792485
A1B2 46955670 294787 1884426 865117
A2B1 46947701 1847449 331927 872923
A2B2 44662839 2563681 2598180 175300
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TABLE VII. Number of correlated events for equal number of trials (5 × 107) per measurement
base settings. Mean photon number µ = 0.1, violation Jn = 2.50× 10−4.
Basis settings ab = 00 ab = 10 ab = 01 ab = 11
A1B1 49312617 155809 185673 345901
A1B2 48633646 127616 867571 371167
A2B1 48652215 825815 149637 372333
A2B2 47597903 1165406 1196733 39958
TABLE VIII. Number of correlated events for equal number of trials (5 × 107) per measurement
base settings. Mean photon number µ = 0.05, violation Jn = 1.99× 10−4.
Basis settings ab = 00 ab = 10 ab = 01 ab = 11
A1B1 49657069 78257 92401 172273
A1B2 49318372 65894 429597 186137
A2B1 49321033 413099 78382 187486
A2B2 48789537 591262 606143 13058
inequality is a linear combination of the probability distribution p(a, b|x, y) and given by
JCH = −p00(0, 0)− p00(0, 1)− p00(1, 0)
+ p00(1, 1) + p
A
0 (0) + p
B
0 (0) ≥ 0.
(19)
Here, we take a more convenient notation of p(a, b|x, y) as pab(x, y), and pA0 (0) (pB0 (0)) refers
to the probability of obtaining 0 when Alice’s (Bob’s) input is 0 (0). Suppose the Bell value
TABLE IX. Number of correlated events for equal number of trials (5×107) per measurement base
settings. Mean photon number µ = 0.02, violation Jn = 9.72× 10−5.
Basis settings ab = 00 ab = 10 ab = 01 ab = 11
A1B1 49848404 36312 39931 75353
A1B2 49692655 31079 192707 83559
A2B1 49686075 192384 35158 86383
A2B2 49448963 272187 274815 4035
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TABLE X. Number of correlated events for equal number of trials (1× 108) per measurement base
settings. Mean photon number µ = 0.01, violation Jn = 6.29× 10−5.
Basis settings ab = 00 ab = 10 ab = 01 ab = 11
A1B1 99837479 38578 42882 81061
A1B2 99671930 33487 205544 89039
A2B1 99651185 213872 40318 94625
A2B2 99396430 298159 301665 3746
TABLE XI. Number of correlated events for equal number of trials (3.58× 108) per measurement
base settings. Mean photon number µ = 0.005, violation Jn = 3.30× 10−5.
Basis settings ab = 00 ab = 10 ab = 01 ab = 11
A1B1 357726090 65895 74068 133947
A1B2 357459604 57387 338791 144218
A2B1 357495160 309855 58769 136216
A2B2 357043095 476212 475809 4884
of the CHSH inequality is JCHSH , the relation is
JCHSH = −JCH/2. (20)
The prepared quantum state is in the form of
|ψ〉 = 1√
1 + r2
(|HV 〉+ r |V H〉). (21)
The measurement of Alice and Bob are projective measurement in the following basis
{cosα |H〉+ sinα |V 〉 ,− sinα |H〉+ cosα |V 〉}. (22)
With given detection efficiency, the optimal state and measurement can be numerically
found.
Apart from the detection efficiency, other experimental imperfections such as imperfect
photon source, background noise, misalignment error should be taken into account in order
to simulate the experiment.
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A. Imperfect input state
To achieve an optimal violation of the CH inequality, we prepare quantum state in the
form of Eq. (21). In practice, the experimentally prepared input state may be imperfect,
deviating from the desired one. One way is to model the imperfectly prepared state by
ρ =
1
1 + r2

0 0 0 0
0 1 V r 0
0 V r r2 0
0 0 0 0
 , (23)
where V can be interpreted as the visibility along a certain measurement direction. Thus
a smaller V represents a larger imperfection. In experiment, we can also perform a state
tomography to directly get an estimation of the prepared state.
B. SPDC source
The photon pair distribution of an SPDC source follows a Poisson distribution,
P (n) =
µn
n!
e−µ. (24)
or a thermal distribution,
P (n) =
µn
(1 + µ)n+1
e−µ, (25)
where µ is the mean photon number. In this case, the source may emit vacuum with
probability P (0), one pair with probability P (1), two pairs with probability P (2), and so
on. When considering no background, the vacuum part contributes 0 to the Bell value and
the rest part contributes positive Bell value.
In the following, we will evaluate the Bell value with multiple photon pairs. As the
probability of multiple photon pairs is very small, we only calculate the averaged Bell value
J2 with two photon pairs as input. We consider threshold detector in our simulation.
In general, there are two detectors for each measurement. For single photon pairs, there
are nine exclusive events as shown in Table XII. For two photon pairs, there are 9× 9 = 81
exclusive events. However, when threshold detectors are used, there are only 4 different
distinguishable events for Alice (Bob), including, 0, 1, u, and double click (detecting 0 and
1 at the same time). As the output of the original CH inequality has only three distinct
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TABLE XII. Possible events for single photon pair.
parties 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Alice 0 0 0 1 1 1 u u u
Bob 0 1 u 0 1 u 0 1 u
outputs for each party, we thus need to assign an output (0, 1, or u) for the events of double
clicks.
Generally, when a double click happens, we randomly assign the output value to be 0,
1, or u, with probability q0, q1, and qu, respectively. For example, when the 00 and 01
events happens for the two pairs, Alice will detect oo and thus also output o, while Bob
will detect 01 and output 0 or 1 with additional probability q0 or q1, respectively. When
q0 = 1 it corresponds to the case that double click events are all assigned to output of 0
which corresponds to the case that only one detector is used for each party.
After the random assignment, the output contains nine exclusive events. Note that, by
saying double click, we actually mean the events of detecting 0 and 1 at the same time. For
the other cases, for instance, when detecting 0 and u or 0 and 0 at the same time, we simply
assign the output to be 0 deterministically. This is because that we cannot distinguish
between the events of 0u, u0, and 00 for each party in experiment.
It is worth mentioning that the random assignment must be performed instantly after
a measurement outcome is observed, such that Alice and Bob cannot communicate. That
is, the events of random assignments of Alice and Bob must be space-likely separated. In
experiment, such requirement can be satisfied by considering that random assignment is
delay-processed in data postprocessing. In this case, the random assignment strategies of
Alice and Bob should be fixed before experiment. This requirement can be fulfilled by
introducing a trusted referee to perform the data postprocessing. He will honestly perform
the random assignment of the data from Alice and Bob with a predetermined strategy.
Suppose the underlying probability distribution of the nine events with single photon pair
conditioned on specific input setting x and y are denoted by pi(x, y) for experimental trial
i, we can calculate the probability pn=21 (x, y) of obtaining 00 with two pairs of photons after
the assignment by
pn=21 (x, y) =
∑
i,j
βijpi(x, y)pj(x, y), (26)
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where the coefficients βij are given by
βij =

1 qa0 1 q
b
0 q
a
0q
b
0 q
a
0 1 q
b
0 1
qa0 0 0 q
a
0q
b
0 0 0 q
b
0 0 0
1 0 0 qa0 0 0 1 0 0
qb0 q
a
0q
b
0 q
a
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
qa0q
b
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
qa0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 qb0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
qb0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

, (27)
where qa0 and q
b
0 refer to the random assignment probability of Alice and Bob, respectively.
For single party detections, there are three types of events: 0, 1, and u. When there
are two pairs, we can similarly assign double click events. For instance, for single detection
probability pA1 (x), where 1 also stands for event o, we have the corresponded one for two
pairs,
pA,n=21 (x) =
∑
i,j
β′ijp
A
i (x)p
A
j (x), (28)
with coefficient defined by
β′ij =

1 qa0 1
qa0 0 0
1 0 0
 (29)
Thus, we can calculate the normalized contribution from two pairs, denoted by J¯n=2
according to Eq. (26) and Eq. (28). Then a weighted Bell value is given by
J ≈ P (1)Jn=1 + P (2)Jn=2. (30)
C. Misalignment error
Due to imperfection in detection, there may also be misalignment error which outputs
value opposite to the real one. Suppose the rate of misalignment error is pM , then each
party will output 0 (1) when its actual value is 1 (0) with probability pM . Denote the events
by the index in Table. XII, then the coincidence probability after misalignment is
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pMi (x, y) =
∑
i
γijpj(x, y),∀i (31)
where the coefficients γij is given by
γij =
(1− pM)2 (1− pM)pM 0 (1− pM)pM p2M 0 0 0 0
(1− pM)pM (1− pM)2 0 p2M (1− pM)pM 0 0 0 0
0 0 (1− pM) 0 0 pM 0 0 0
(1− pM)pM p2M 0 (1− pM)2 (1− pM)pM 0 0 0 0
p2M (1− pM)pM 0 (1− pM)pM (1− pM)2 0 0 0 0
0 0 pM 0 0 (1− pM) 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 (1− pM) pM 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 pM (1− pM) 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

,
For single detections, such as pA0 (x), we similarly have
pA,M0 (x) = (1− pM)pA0 (x) + pMpA1 (x). (32)
D. Dark count
In this part, we consider how background affects the experiment. Suppose the background
is described by pB, which denotes the probability of detecting a dark count for each detector.
For instance, when the number of emitted pulses and dark counts are n and B for each
detector, then pB = B/n.
Due to the existence of dark counts, the Bell value will be affected when the input is
vacuum. For coincidence detection p00(x, y), the probability contributed from dark counts is
pB,n=000 (x, y) = p
2
B; for single detection p
A
0 (x), the probability contributed from dark counts
is pB,n=00 (x) = pB.
For the inputs with nonzero photon pairs, the situation becomes more complicated. For
instance, when the source emit one photon pair, the probability contributed from dark counts
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of coincidence detection p00(x, y) is
pB,n=100 (x, y) = p00(x, y)ηa(1− ηb)pB + p00(x, y)(1− ηa)ηbpB
+ p00(x, y)(1− ηa)(1− ηb)p2B + (1− p00(x, y))p2B,
(33)
where the four terms correspond to four cases of the detection of the photon pair: Bob
detects vacuum due to loss, Alice detect vacuum due to loss, Alice and Bob both detect
vacuum due to loss, Alice and Bob detect other events. Here, we only consider that Alice
and Bob each use one detector. The result is only slightly different when they each use two
detectors.
Denote the normalized contribution from dark count by JB, then the total Bell value J
is given by
J ≈ JB + P (1)Jn=1 + P (2)Jn=2. (34)
In our simulation, we first generate the probability distribution by using the quantum
state from tomography. Then, we consider misalignment error and multi-photon states.
Finally, we take into account the contribution from background noise.
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FIG. 9. Simulation result. The relation between Bell inequality violation and mean photon number.
In our simulation, we set pB = 2× 10−6 and pM = 0.002.
VII. RANDOMNESS EXTRACTION
Toeplitz extractor is used for randomness extraction from raw data [32, 33]. In total, we
have 4×1010 experimental trials. 2 bits are used to record the detection results in each trial.
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For instance, a = 0, b = 1 represent that Alice does not detect a photon while Bob detects
one photon, which is noted as ab = 01 in the text. As a result, 8× 1010 bits of raw data are
collected. Multiplying a Toeplitz matrix with dimensions m× n = (4.56× 107)× (8× 1010)
to the raw data vector with a dimension n = 8 × 1010 yields a vector with a dimension
m = 4.56× 107.
A m× n Toeplitz matrix takes the from:
Tm×n =

a0 a−1 · · · a−(n−2) a−(n−1)
a1 a0
. . . a−(n−1)+1
a2 a1
. . . . . .
...
...
...
. . . a−(n−1)+(m−2)
am−1 am−2 · · · a−n+(m−1) a−(n−1)+(m−1)

(35)
with raw data vector:
Vn =

v0
v1
v2
...
vn−1

(36)
The result is:
Rm =

r0
r1
r2
...
rm−1

(37)
The result random number is obtained by a multiplication between a Toeplitz matrix and a
vector:
Rm = Tm×n × Vn (38)
An fast Fourier transform (FFT) can be applied to speed up the multiplication:
Tm×n × Vn = IFFT (FFT (Tm+n−1) · FFT (Vm)) (39)
Here FFT is the fast Fourier transform on the vector, Tm+n−1 is the elements (a−(n−1), ..., a−1, a0, a1, ..., am−1)
in the Toeplitz matrix. IFFT is the inverse fast Fourier transform of the product of the
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vectors. In calculation, the vector dimension should be expand to m+n−1 by adding zeros
at the end.
In our experiment, we divide the matrix into k = n/l blocks each with dimension m× l:
Tm×n =
(
T 0m×l T
1
m×l · · · T k−1m×l
)
(40)
and the block T im×l is:
T im×l =

a−i·l a−(i·l+1) · · · a−(i·l+l−1)
a−i·l+1 a−i·l
. . . a−(i·l+l−1)+1
...
...
...
a−i·l+m−1 a−i·l+m−2 · · · a−(i·l+l−1)+m−1
 (41)
Similarly, the vector is divided into k blocks:
Vn =

V 0l
V 1l
...
V k−1l
 (42)
with each block:
V il =

vi·l
vi·l+1
...
vi·l+l−1
 (43)
For each block, FFT speed up can be applied, and a series of blocks of result is obtained:
R′m =
(
R0l R
1
l · · · Rk−1l
)
(44)
where Ril = T
i
m×l · V il , with each block:
Ril =

ri0
ri1
...
rim−1
 (45)
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Finally, each row of the result block is added to give the result:
Rm =

Σir
i
0
Σir
i
1
...
Σir
i
m−1
 (46)
The blocked algorithm is slower than the full FFT algorithm, but it saves memory. We
perform the extraction calculation on a personal computer with 16 Gbytes memory by
dividing the original data into 800 blocks, which takes 17 hrs including data loading and
computation.
VIII. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
We obtain 4.56× 107 random bits. We use 45 M bits data with section length set to 450
K bits for NIST statistical test [34]. As shown in Tab. XIII, the random bits successfully
pass the NIST tests.
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FIG. 10. Then final random numbers are divided into two parts (a) and (b), each figure contains
1000× 950 pixels. For each pixel, 3 bytes random data are used to control the RGB color. All the
random numbers generated in the experiment are used to draw the two figures.
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